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Recent Interest Rate Trends
INTEREST RATES rose in most sectors of
the U.S. money and capital markets during
the first 10 months of 1963. This was in
contrast to 1962 when long-term rates de-
clined generally and short-term rates showed
only small net advances.
Short-term rates fluctuated in a narrow
range during the first 4 months of 1963,
but from mid-May to mid-November they
rose by around
 s/s of a percentage point.
Monetary and other policy actions taken to
help reduce the deficit in the U.S. balance of
payments contributed to the uptrend.
Yields on State and local government,
Treasury, and high-grade corporate bonds
turned up in late 1962 or early 1963, but
their subsequent advances were characteris-
tically smaller than those of short-term rates.
While rates on mortgages and yields on lower
quality corporate bonds extended their 1962
declines during the first part of 1963, they
subsequently tended to stabilize.
Since both the magnitude and in a few in-
stances the direction of yield changes were
different in different sectors of the money
and capital markets, spreads within the to-
tal structure of interest rates changed. The
gap between short- and long-term rates nar-
rowed, as is typical when money conditions
firm and interest rates rise. And spreads be-
tween rates on mortgages and yields on U.S.
Government and high-grade corporate
bonds also narrowed. While yields on U.S.
Government and high-grade State and local
government bonds followed roughly the
same pattern of advance, those on Treasury
issues advanced more than yields on sea-
soned high-grade corporate bonds. Over the
longer period from the fall of 1961 to the fall
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of 1963, yields on Treasury bonds rose rela-
tive to those on all other capital market
instruments, as the preceding chart shows.
RATES IN CAPITAL MARKETS
To a considerable extent both the general
decline of long-term interest rates during
1962 and the subsequent advance of most of
these rates during 1963 were attributable to
factors affecting the supply of funds. These
factors included changes in flows of funds
to financial intermediaries, changes in mone-
tary policy, and revisions in the interest rate
expectations of lenders, as their outlook on
likely business and financial developments
changed.
Although net new borrowing in mortgages
and State and local government bonds rose
to record highs during 1962 and the first 9
months of 1963, a significant part of the
growth in both types of debt was probably
induced by the ample supply of funds seek-
ing investment in these sectors.
Likewise, in the U.S. Government securi-
ties market, additions to public holdings of
new issues maturing in more than 5 years
were unusually large in both 1962 and the
first 3 quarters of 1963, due chiefly to the
increased interest of lenders in long-term
investments. More than half of the total
growth in public holdings of such issues oc-
curred in Treasury advance refundings.
Borrowing via long-term corporate securi-
ties in 1962 and the first 9 months of 1963
was less than in 1961. This reduced demand
for funds from corporations reflected their
increased ability to meet cash needs from
internal cash flows. In previous cycles cor-
porate cash flows leveled off or declined after
the early recovery period. In the present
cycle, however, they have continued to rise,
partly because of the new investment tax
credit and the Treasury's revised deprecia-
tion guidelines but also in reflection of a
continued gradual expansion of earnings.
Factors in the 1962 rate decline. Long-term
interest rates turned down in 1962 because
the flow of funds to capital markets tended
to outstrip growth in demands for funds
from long-term borrowers. The supply ele-
ment that contributed most significantly to
the decline was the accelerated flow of funds
into time and savings deposits at commercial
banks. Flows to mutual savings banks, sav-
ings and loan associations, and credit unions
also continued to grow at a brisk pace.
Aggregate savings flows to all of these
institutions rose sharply in the 1960-61 reces-
sion, as they had in the 1957-58 recession.
But contrary to previous cyclical experience,
they continued to grow rapidly in 1962,
along with economic activity, as the upper-
most section of the accompanying chart
shows. For reasons that are developed below
this counter-cyclical growth in savings flows
to financial intermediaries added to the sup-
ply of funds in capital markets.
The particular factor initiating the sharp
increase in flows to financial intermediaries
in 1962 was the joint action of the Federal
Reserve System and the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation raising the maximum
rates commercial banks may pay on time
and savings deposits. These higher ceilings
gave commercial banks leeway to pay rates
competitive with those available on direct
investments in marketable securities. In par-
ticular, they made it possible for banks to
offer rates on time deposits and certificates
that were competitive with yields on money
market instruments.
During 1961 several security dealers
had established a secondary market for trad-
ing in time certificates of large city banks.
As a result, investor interest in these nego-
tiable instruments had grown rapidly. After
Federal Reserve Bulletin: November 1963RECENT INTEREST RATE TRENDS 1497
ceiling rates were raised at the beginning
of 1962, growth in time CD's accelerated
further, accounting for nearly three-eighths
of the growth in total time and savings de-
posits at weekly reporting banks in 1962.
As commercial banks took advantage of
the higher rate ceilings, some other savings
institutions responded with increases of
their own. The step-up of rates available
on time and savings accounts greatly en-
hanced the attractiveness of such investments
and channeled a larger proportion of total
savings into this form. To some extent the
appeal of these fixed interest returns was
further enhanced by the impact on investor
sentiment of the sharp break in stock market
prices in 1962 and by the general tendency
for investors to downgrade the inflation psy-
chology that had been carried over from the
1950's.
The importance of commercial banks in
the expanded flow of funds to capital mar-
kets in 1962 is indicated by the middle panel
of the following chart. In addition to the
sharp growth in time and savings deposits,
the combination of stimulative monetary
policy and a slower-than-usual cyclical
growth in business loan demands also left
banks with resources that could be allocated
to longer-term investments.
Faced with the accelerated growth and
higher costs of their time and savings depos-
its, commercial banks began early in 1962
to place more emphasis on yield and less on
liquidity in their investment policies. They
reduced their holdings of lower yielding
Treasury bills and invested actively in
long-term capital markets. At first their
interest was centered in State and local
government securities in order to obtain
high after-tax yields. This brought about
a sharp decline in yields in the State and
local government market. As deposit growth
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continued, banks began to invest heavily in
mortgages as well and to lengthen their port-
folios of U.S. Government securities.
Responding to this large bank appetite
for longer-term investments, the Treasury
in its 1962 financings offered nearly $13
billion of new issues with maturities of
more than 5 years to the public. While the
relatively high coupon rates on these new
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bonds attracted other investors as well as
banks, banks took the lion's share of most
issues.
Despite the accelerated flow of funds to
commercial banks in 1962, savings accounts
at other financial intermediaries also con-
tinued to grow at a rate about in line with
past trends. Flows to all institutions accept-
ing time and savings balances thus rose
sharply in relation to total private long-term
borrowing, as the preceding chart shows.
As is usual, funds available to these other
savings institutions went largely into the
mortgage market. With commercial banks
also showing an increased interest in mort-
gages, lenders generally found it difficult
to put available funds to work at the yield
levels which prevailed in early 1962. Ac-
cordingly, to keep fully invested they eased
mortgage rates and other lending terms.
It is difficult to ascertain whether the
funds that accounted for the rapid general
rise in time and savings balances during
1962 were funds that would otherwise have
remained in idle demand deposits or would
have gone directly into particular short- or
long-term market instruments or into spend-
ing. To the extent the funds were merely
diverted from direct investment in such in-
struments as State and local government
bonds, the total flow of funds to capital
markets was of course not changed, except
perhaps in particular subsectors.
However, a large share of the funds chan-
neled into time and savings balances clearly
represented liquidity reserves which, in the
absence of these alternatives, would very
likely have been either invested in short-term
debt instruments, such as Treasury bills, or
held in the form of money. The very large
amounts of funds placed in marketable time
certificates of deposit of commercial banks,
for example, were diverted chiefly from
direct investment in money market instru-
ments.
In practice, therefore, the higher rates on
time and savings balances established in
1962 channeled a large volume of short-
term funds that would otherwise have been
invested in short-term assets into the capi-
tal markets, where they helped to satisfy
the demands of long-term borrowers. Other
things being equal, this tended to depress
rates in the capital markets and to raise
rates in short-term markets.
The general decline of long-term interest
rates in 1962 was accentuated by lender
expectations. In the face of the stock market
break and of uncertainties created by a slow-
ing of the economic expansion, lenders
tended to view current rates on long-term
assets favorably in relation to those that
might be available in the near future. There-
fore, they bid actively to obtain such assets.
Factors in the 1963 rate advance. By early
1963 it began to become apparent that the
1962 rate decline had gone too far. Better
business news dissipated some of the earlier
uncertainty on the economic outlook, and
psychology was further improved by the
rapid rise in stock prices starting in late
1962. Around the turn of the year the
posture of monetary policy shifted further
toward less ease. At the same time, security
offerings in capital markets by governmental
units—Federal and State and local—re-
mained unusually large. Later, the rate of
growth in time and savings balances showed
signs of slackening.
In light of all these developments com-
mercial banks and other lenders began to
adjust their outlook on interest rates and
tended to hold back in the commitment of
funds until rates advanced to higher levels.
As the year progressed these early rate in-
fluences were reinforced. A sharp deteriora-
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tion in the U.S. balance of payments posi-
tion during the second quarter led to further
Government measures for dealing with the
deficit—including an increase of V2 a per-
centage point in the Federal Reserve dis-
count rate to 3 V2 per cent and some further
firming of open market policy. With short-
term interest rates rising generally in re-
sponse to these monetary actions, yields on
most bonds also rose, but only moderately.
Finally, as economic activity continued to
move up, business demands for bank credit
gathered additional momentum, and business
optimism became more widespread. In the
face of all these developments lenders tended
to view further interest rate advances as
likely, which in itself tended to augment the
rise.
The volume of time certificates outstand-
ing at city banks increased after the interest
rate ceiling on deposits maturing in 3 months
to 1 year was raised in July to 4 per cent.
Still the annual rate of growth in commer-
cial bank time and savings deposits was less
in the first 10 months of this year than last,
and flows of funds to savings and share ac-
counts at other institutions in the first 9
months were below the advanced rates of
late 1962. While banks continued to absorb
about 90 per cent of the heavy volume of
new State and local bond offerings during
the first 9 months of 1963, several develop-
ments—including the further firming of
monetary policy during the summer, rising
rates on short-term money market instru-
ments, and the general reduction in bank
liquidity—raised questions among market
participants as to whether banks would con-
tinue to absorb State and local government
securities in such volume. These uncertain-
ties led to some congestion in the municipal
securities market and to a further rise in
yields.
SHORT-TERM INTEREST RATES
Interest rates on short-term debt instruments,
as the uppermost section of the accompany-
ing chart shows, have advanced in three
stages since the recession: The initial ad-
vance, ranging from roughly % to V2 a per-
centage point, occurred in the latter half of
k^r ^
NOTE.—Bill rates are market yields. Effective rate for Fed-
eral funds is rate for heaviest volume of purchases and sales
as reported to F.R. Bank of New York. For time deposits
and certificates, all rates shown are ceilings, except for
time CD's in late 1962 and 1963, which represent midpoints
of the range of dealer offered quotations on 6-month matur-
itites in the secondary market. Range between high and low
quotations varied from 4 to 20 basis points in that period.
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1961 as the domestic economy moved out
of the recession. Over the next 17 months
there were net increases, but they were small.
Then in late May 1963 rates turned upward,
and in less than 5 months rose about as much
as in the previous 24 months.
Impact of discount rate change. Just before
the mid-July increase in the Federal Reserve
discount rate short-term interest rates re-
corded a sizable advance. During this
period the press reported preliminary esti-
mates indicating that the payments deficit
had become much worse in the second quar-
ter. At the same time money market data
began to show some lessening of marginal
reserve availability in the banking system.
These developments, along with testimony
by Treasury officials at congressional hear-
ings on possible ways of dealing with the
payments deficit, led to market expectations
that a change in monetary policy was immi-
nent. Thus, by mid-July the 90-day Treasury
bill rate had already risen about Vs of a per-
centage point from its mid-May level of
2.90 per cent.
Because of this anticipatory advance,
Treasury bill rates at first showed little
additional response to the increase in the
discount rate. Within a short time, however,
the higher costs of reserves borrowed at
Reserve Banks were further reflected in other
money market rates, particularly in rates for
Federal funds, and in rates paid by Govern-
ment security dealers for financing their
security inventories. Subsequently the 90-
day bill rate also pushed higher and by early
November exceeded the discount rate by a
small margin.
Other factors in the recent rate advance.
Other factors that contributed to the rise in
short-term rates after May were the con-
tinued expansion of economic activity and
the increased business optimism it created,
the further firming of bank reserve policy,
and the mid-July action of the Federal Re-
serve and Federal Deposit Insurance Cor-
poration raising maximum permissible rates
on time deposits at commercial banks.
The further firming of money conditions
after May caused banks to liquidate some
holdings of U.S. Government securities
and forced them to rely more on borrowings
at the Federal Reserve to meet their mar-
ginal reserve needs. In the 6 months from
mid-May through mid-November, borrow-
ings of all member banks at the Federal
Reserve averaged more than $300 million,
about double the average for the preceding
6 months; and their net free reserves aver-
aged $130 million compared with $325
million in the earlier period.
The increase in ceiling rates on time de-
posits made it possible for commercial banks
to offer more competitive rates on time cer-
tificates—particularly those with maturities
of from 3 to 6 months, on which the ceiling
rate had previously been only 2Vi per cent.
Banks moved promptly to take advantage
of this greater leeway, and the resulting
competition for short-term funds operated
to reinforce the general advance in short-
term rates.
Seasonal deficit financing by the Treas-
ury usually exerts upward pressure on
short-term interest rates during the last half
of every year, but in the 4 months ending
with October, the Treasury covered a large
part of its cash needs out of existing bal-
ances. Net cash borrowing thus amounted
to under $2.5 billion, less than in the equiva-
lent period of other recent years and less
than previously expected.
Nevertheless, gross Treasury cash borrow-
ing of $6 billion was spread over five suc-
cessive special Treasury bill auctions of $1
to $2 billion each—running from late Aug-
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ust to late October. Three of these repre-
sented the start of a new monthly cycle of
1-year Treasury bill auctions. The other
two were a bill strip auction and a tax
anticipation bill auction. Since none of these
operations permitted commercial banks to
make payment by crediting Treasury tax
and loan deposits, Government security
dealers had to provide most of the under-
writing. This operated to keep bill rates
under upward pressure.
Role of public policy. Looking more
broadly at the economic upswing since
1961, the movement of short-term rates in
the period was particularly affected by three
influences. One was the large transfer of
funds from short- to long-term markets,
already described. The other two were Fed-
eral Reserve open market policy and Treas-
ury debt management policy.
Policy actions of the latter two types were
directed at minimizing downward pressure
on short-term rates during the earlier part
of the period and later at exerting upward
pressure on these rates. Higher short-term
rates—particularly for Treasury bills—
were considered desirable both to restrain
interest-sensitive outflows of short-term cap-
ital and to bolster confidence in the dollar
among participants in foreign exchange mar-
kets. While the Federal Reserve and the
Treasury have pursued these objectives
jointly, the relative roles they have played
changed somewhat as the economy moved
to higher levels of activity.
The Federal Reserve has consistently pur-
sued a policy designed to encourage bank
credit expansion. Within the framework of
this policy, it has conducted open market
operations in a manner designed to mini-
mize the downward impact of its purchases
on short-term rates. To this end, in February
1961 the System extended its open market
buying to include longer-term securities,
provided the market supply of such issues
was sufficient to permit buying without
pressing prices to unsustainable levels.
As the economy moved out of the 1961
recession and advanced to new high levels
of activity, the Federal Reserve gradually
modified the posture of active ease it had
adopted in the recession. Each of these
moves to less ease was intended to moderate
slightly the rate of expansion in bank re-
serves, and thus to exert some upward
pressure on short-term rates. Each was taken
when unfavorable developments in the bal-
ance of payments were creating concern
about the possibility of an accelerated out-
flow of short-term capital and when favor-
able developments in the domestic economy
indicated further expansion was likely.
The rate on 90-day Treasury bills re-
sponded to these policy modifications, as the
preceding chart shows, although the re-
sponse in mid-1962 was distorted for a short
time by expectations of possible, more dras-
tic policy moves prompted by the Canadian
balance of payments crisis and by talk of a
possible "quickie" cut in U.S. income taxes.
For the period from mid-1961 to early 1963,
when the effective rate on Federal funds
remained generally below the Federal Re-
serve discount rate, the pattern of change in
the funds rate provides a more striking in-
dication of the relative impact of monetary
policy on money market conditions.
Although successive System policy modifi-
cations thus contributed to the rise in short-
term rates, they did not keep bank credit
from continuing to grow substantially. The
total expanded at the unusually rapid rate
of nearly 9 per cent during 1962 and 7.4
per cent (annual rate) in the first 9 months
of 1963. Moreover, although average bor-
rowing at the Federal Reserve rose after
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May 1963, member banks as a group con-
tinued to show net free reserves. This con-
trasts sharply with the cyclical expansions
of the 1950's when the banking system
showed a large net borrowed reserve posi-
tion.
Treasury debt management. During most
of the economic advance the Treasury has
used debt operations to exert upward pres-
sure on short-term rates. Its principal means
of achieving this objective has been to
finance the bulk of the continuing Federal
cash deficit in the Treasury bill market. In
setting the terms and the timing of these bill
auctions, the Treasury has sought to maxi-
mize their upward impact on market rates.
Since 1961, however, the Treasury has
also stressed debt extension in its other
financing operations. Its ability to do this
without compromising short-term rate ob-
jectives was due in large measure to the
willingness of banks to hold a larger propor-
tion of their Government security portfolio
in longer-term issues.
Prompted by a desire to rebuild secondary
reserves—depleted in the 1955-59 period of
economic expansion and monetary restraint
—commercial banks had expanded their
holdings of short-term Treasury issues dur-
ing late 1960 and 1961 by more than the
net increase in such debt available to the
public, as the table shows. But when eco-
nomic expansion in 1962 failed to fulfill ex-
pectations—with monetary policy remain-
ing easy, and with the large inflow of time
and savings deposits—bank demands for
liquidity declined. In the 2 years ending with
September 1963, they reduced their holdings
of short-dated Treasury debt by $8.9 billion.
Some of this represented net liquidation of
Treasury bills, but much of it reflected tak-
ings of the longer-term issues offered in
Treasury refinancings.
PUBLIC HOLDINGS OF SHORT-TERM
U. S. GOVERNMENT SECURITIES
(In billions of dollars)
Type of holder
and issue
Commercial banks:
Treasury bills
Coupon issues....
Total. . . .
Nonbank holders:
Treasury bills
Coupon issues
Total
All holders:
Treasury bills
Coupon issues
Total
Change in
12 months ending—
Sept.
1961
. + 5.4
. + 7.1
. +12.5
- .6
- .7
. + 5.4
. + 6.5
+ 11.9
Sept.
1962
-3.1
- .9
-4.0
+4.0
- .5
+3.5
+ .9
-1.4
_ 5
Sept.
1963
+ 1.0
-5.9
-4.9
+3.7
-2.5
+ 1.2
+4.7
-8.5
-3.8
NOTE.—Changes are calculated from Treasury Survey of
Ownership data. Public holdings exclude securities held by
Federal agencies and trust funds and the Federal Reserve.
Survey data for commercial bank holdings were adjusted by
Federal Reserve to obtain an estimate of total bank holdings.
Short-term issues are those with maturities of less than
1 year; partially tax-exempt issue is to first call.
With banks reducing their bill holdings
and the Treasury adding to the total supply,
nonbank holdings of bills rose by $7.7 bil-
lion, more than offsetting a $3 billion drop
in their holdings of short-term Treasury
coupon issues, resulting from Treasury ef-
forts at debt extension.
Over the same period the supply of bank
time certificates of deposit grew by well over
$5 billion, and that of commercial paper
and bankers' acceptances by more than
$2.5 billion. Thus despite the Treasury em-
phasis on lengthening of the debt in its re-
funding operations, the supply of short-term
money market instruments that were avail-
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able to meet demands for liquidity was sub-
stantially increased.
SHORT- VERSUS LONG-TERM RATES
Since the 1961 recession, changes in the
spread between yields on short- and long-
term Government securities have received
considerable attention. This interest has
been prompted largely by the efforts of eco-
nomic policy to promote domestic economic
growth, while at the same time exerting up-
ward pressure on short-term interest rates.
The chart shows changing relationships
within the term structure of Treasury yields
over the past three cycles. In all three cycles
spreads within the yield structure were
widest when monetary conditions were easy.
Because money remained easy longer during
NOTE.—Three-month rate is market yield on bills. Rates
for 20- and 5-year maturities are constant maturity yields
based on yield-curve data supplied by U.S. Treasury and
Morgan-Guaranty Trust Company. Figures are plotted
monthly.
the current economic upswing, yield spreads
also remained wider over a longer period.
Treasury bill rates in the 1961 recession
never reached the extreme lows of the two
previous recessions, due in part to official
efforts to restrain declines. Nevertheless, the
spread between yields on bills and long-term
bonds was about the same in both the recent
recession and the 1954 downswing.
In the first 5 months of 1961 and again
in 1962 the yield spread between Treasury
bonds and Treasury bills narrowed as long-
term rates declined. In earlier periods when
long-term rates declined on any similarly
sustained basis, short-term rates usually
declined by more. Narrowing of the spread
in the 1961 period reflected in part the fact
that bank and other demands for liquidity
were met with a greatly expanded supply of
short-term Treasury securities, chiefly as a
result of Treasury financings. At the trough
of the two earlier recessions, the supply of
short-term debt had been substantially re-
duced by Treasury debt lengthening opera-
tions.
The supply of short-term issues available
to the public in the first 5 months of 1961
was also augmented by net sales of about
$1.7 billion from the portfolios of the Fed-
eral Reserve System and of Federal agencies
and trust funds. At the same time, these
official accounts made offsetting purchases
of longer-term securities, including over
$1.1 billion of issues due in more than 5
years. These purchases, and the expectations
of further purchases they created, contrib-
uted to the decline in yields on longer
maturities and thus helped to reduce the
yield spread between short- and long-term
Treasury obligations.
The tendency for spreads to narrow
within the Treasury yield structure in 1962
was due chiefly to the large transfer of
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funds from short- to long-term markets by
financial intermediaries. In addition, the
decline in long-term rates reflected changed
expectations, while the net advance of short-
term rates in the face of these expectations
reflected System policy shifts to slightly less
ease.
During 1962 the Federal Reserve and
Federal agencies and trust funds made net
market purchases of $0.6 billion of Treasury
bonds due in more than 5 years. To a limited
extent this buying helped to cushion the
impact on rates of the large additions to
public holdings of such issues in Treasury
financings.
The marked further narrowing of the
spread between short and long rates during
1963 has occurred as short-term rates have
risen more than long-term. This pattern of
change is typical in periods of generally
rising rates. But, as the chart shows, the
relative magnitude of the advance in long-
term rates through mid-November was less
than in some earlier periods of rising short-
term rates, when money conditions were
tight. Although Treasury offerings to the
public of new issues with maturities of more
than 5 years totaled about $15 billion in the
first 10 months of 1963, two-thirds of this
increase occurred in advance refundings,
which have the smallest immediate impact
on market rates per dollar of financing of
any type of Treasury operation. Moreover,
in this period, Federal agencies and trust
funds acquired $1.5 billion of such issues in
the market, and the Federal Reserve ac-
quired about $0.6 billion.
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